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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
[JOORA MECHAM, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
1'1E INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, EI TEL McCULLOUGH, I NC., 
FIDELITY CASUALTY COMPANY and 
SECUND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 
19337 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Industrial Commission 
den1ing plaintiff's Motion for permanent-total disability, the 
1ame having been affirmed by the adoption of the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Administrative Law 
,Judge. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the plaintiff was 
not entitled to permanent-total disability benefits because her 
appl1cat1on for the same was barred by the Statute of Limitations 
contained within Section 35-1-99 Utah Code Annotated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the Order of the 
,\am1r,istrative Law Judge as affirmed by the Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent will briefly summarize the facts as contained 
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w i th i n the Adm i n i strati v e Law Judge ' s Fi n di n gs of Fact , with t n, 
appropriate references to the record, as the same are accur~tP. 
(R. 182) 
On or about December 17, 1982, the Applicant, through her 
counsel, filed a "Petition for Consideration of Permanent-Total 
Disability and Reimbursement of Medi cal Expenses". She requestea 
a finding of permanent and total disability as well as an 
accounting of the reimbursed medical expenses paid by her husban 1 
and Medicare. (R. 161) 
The Applicant sustained a low back injury on October 31, 
1961, while employed by defendant, Eitel McCullough, Inc. (R. 11 
As a result of the injury, she received temporary-total 
disability benefits commencing the day of her injury and 
continuing for 82 weeks and two days thereafter. She returned 
work on September 19, 1963. On or about October 14, 1963, the 
Applicant filed an Application for Physical Examination by a 
Medi cal Advisory Board, which was the predecessor of the present 
Disability Rating Panel. (R. 25). On January 25, 1964, the 
Applicant was examined by the Advisory Board and found to have 
sustained a 20% permanent-partial impairment of the whole body 
due to her back injury of October 31, 1961. (R. 32) 
She was again examined by the Advisory Medical Panel on 
April 4, 1964, and the original findings confirmed. The 
Commission advised the Applicant she would receive 40 weeks ot 
permanent-partial impairment benefits commencing September 26, 
1963, and would be paid until a total of $1 ,560.00 had been paid. 
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«"- 34). On or about May 4, 1964, the Applicant, through her 
, 0 ,,nsel, filed a Petition for Rehearing with the Commission, 
cld: 111 1ng the permanent-partial impairment found by the Medical 
Advisory Board, was without evidentiary foundation. (R. 36). 
The Commission treated the Petition as one for an Application for 
F 0 rm al Hear i n g • A hear i n g was he l d on September l 3, l 9 6 5. She 
was sent to a Medical Advisory Board for further physical 
examination on October 16, 1965. (R. 78). She was examined by 
the Board and found to have a 20% permanent-partial impairment of 
the whole body. Because of an objection, she was required to 
return to the Medical Advisory Board on November 20, 1965, and, 
at that time, the Board recommended that the file be referred to 
a 111 e d i c a l p a n e l • Sh e n ow w a s c l a i mi n g p s y c h i at r i c e x p e n s e s • 
On December 2, 1965, Commissioner Wiesley appointed Dr. Boyd 
G. Holbrook as chairman of the medical panel and also associated 
Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson, Dr. Jack Tedro and Dr. Chester B. Powell 
as members of the panel. On or about February 21, 1966, the 
panel report was received. It indicated that the Applicant's 
psychiatric treatment, medications and hospitalization were the 
primary result of an independent process rather than attributable 
to the industrial accident. (R. 109). Her 20% disability rating 
neretofore given the Applicant by two prior medical advisory 
'"'er d s w a s a f f i rm e d • The App 1 i cant t hen f i 1 e d an object i on t o 
'he mh11cal panel report and a hearing was held on the objections 
"~June b, 1966. (R. 122). The Commission thereafter entered its 
Order of August 3, 1966, finding that there was no apparent 
-4-
change in the testimony of the panel chairmen and that thP 
Applicant had submitted no new testimony. (R. 136). The 
Commission further found that the Applicant was entitled to 
receive from the defendants 40 weeks of compensation totaling 
$1,560.00, all of which had heretofore been paid. The Order J:;,, 
indicates that the Applicant was paid compensation to and 
including December, 1964. 
On July 6, 1970, the Commission received an Application fc• 
Hearing filed by the Applicant indicating that defendants had 
refused to pay any and all benefits in that they had refused to 
pay medical expenses. (R. 144). On July 10, 1970, Judge Peter 
Marthakis, II, informed the Applicant, by mail, that she should 
file an Application for Additional Benefits instead of requestinc 
a hearing and enclosed the proper forms for her to use. 
(R. 145). He also directed the applicant to Paragraph 6 of the 
forms providing: 
Applicant alleges a substantial change in her physical 
condition and requires additional medical, hospital and 
compensation benefits based on the fol lowing change: (Note, 
it is absolutely essential that this allegation be supporte: 
by current medical reports from treating physicians 
indicating) : 
a. The present disability is greater than the disability 
stated in part (B) of Paragraph four. 
b. The higher disability is due to the accident stated ir, 
Paragraph (l) above. 
c. Additional medical, hospital and treatment is 
required because of the accident stated in Paragrah (1) 
above. This matter will not be set for hearing or other 
action taken until this report is filed. 
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l·Jllowing this letter from Judge Marthakis, nothing further 
1;/11 s rec el ved from the Applicant Lint i l December, 1982. (R. 161) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The record shows as a matter of law, that based upon Section 
.\o-1-99 Utah Code Annotated and the decision of this Court in the 
case of Beverly R. Buxton v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 587 
'2d 121, the claim of the Applicant is barred by the Statute of 
Limitations: 
At the last hearing of the above matter on April 27, 1983, 
the attorney representing the Applicant admitted that no medical 
bills or information of any kind had ever been submitted to any 
of the respondent-defendants for their approval, payment or 
otnerwise, and to this day, none have been received. The 
Applicant, through her counsel, sought to characterize the July 
6, I 9 7 0 f i l i n g as t i me l y for the purpose of ob ta i n i n g permanent -
total disability benefits. As pointed out in the Memorandum 
r1ecis-1nn of the Administrative Law Judge: 
However, counsel's reasoning in this regard is flawed in 
certain respects. First, the filing of July 6, 1970, was 
not timely in any form or fashion. The file clearly 
indicates that the Applicant last received any compensation 
from the defendants in December, 1964. Pursuant to 35-1-99, 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, effective May 9, 1961, 
provided that a claim for compensation must be filed in 
thr~e years from the date of the accident or the last date 
or µayment. In the instant manner, the last payment was 
1nade in December, l 964, and accordingly, Mrs. Mecham' s claim 
'hould have been filed no later than December, 1967. In the 
alternative, if we apply the six-year Statute of Limitations 
found in Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
Mdy ·j, 1981, the Applicant's claim of July 6, 1970, was 
still not timely in that, if the injury occurred on October 
31 , 1 'l 6 l , s i x ye a rs f r om t hat date w o u 1 d have been 0 ct ob er 
31, 1967, which is three years earlier than the Applicant's 
filing of 1970. (R. 184) 
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The judge then correctly concluded that by virtue of thP 
statute, cited above, and the decision of this Court in the cas; 
of Beverly Buxton v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 587 P2a 1?1, 
her cl aim for permanent di s ab i l i t y i s barred • The Court 
correctly held that the only Limitations of Actions Statute, 
which has application to permanent-total disability claims is 
Section 99 of the Act. 
The facts in the instant case clearly reflect that the 
Applicant should have made application for permanent-total 
disability benefits and filed the same no later than December, 
1967, which would have been three years from the last payment of 
compensation or within three years from the date of the accident, 
which would have been October 31, 1964. Obviously, as pointed 
out by the Administrative Law Judge, the later date is the one'" 
be utilized and even giving the Applicant the benefit of the 
doubt with regard to the July 6, 1970 filing, it was clear that 
her filing was three years too late for the purpose of 
maintaining her claim for total disability. 
Inasmuch as no medical expenses had ever been submitted to 
the defendants for review nor were they supported by any record 
as such, the Court appropriately indicated to the Applicant that 
as far as medical expenses were concerned, there was nothing 
before the Administrative Law Judge for consideration. 
The judge then appropriately pointed out to counsel for;'•• 
Applicant, that before any additional medical expenses were made 
an issue in additional proceedings, he should review the Medical 
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!'.inPI Report of February 21, 1966, which specifically found: 
Under these circumstances it would appear that the 
psychiatric treatment, medications and hospitalizations are 
primarly the result of an independent process rather than 
attributable to this alleged accident. 
To this date, no medical expenses or claims for medical 
expenses have ever been presented to the defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the record, which is very ably summarized in the 
findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge dated May 10, 1983, clearly reflects 
that the Applicant's position cannot be maintained and that her 
claim is barred by the Statute of L imitations as ex plained in the 
Buxton decision heretofore cited. 
The Order of the Commission should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 
1984. 
____ day of June, 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
Attorney for Eitel McCullough, 
Inc. and Fidelity Casualty Co. 
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